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I Introduction
There exist only a few macroecono-
metric models for the Thai economy. A
simple but pioneering model was con-
structed in the middle of the 1960's by
Chinawoot Soonthornsima [1964], while
detailed and comprehensive models were
developed only recently by Chulalong-
korn University (Virabongsa Ramang-
kura [1975, 1976]) and the Bank of
Thailand (Olarn Chaipravat [1976],
Olarn Chaipravat, Kanitta Meesook and
* The present paper depends on the progress
report for the medium-term projections pro-
ject of ESCAP drafted in October 1979 by
the author who had worked at Development
Planning Division, ESCAP, as an economic
affairs officer for the one-year fixed term from
November 9, 1978 to November 8, 1979.
The paper owes much to the valuable assist-
ance and cooperation given by Mr. Olarn
Chaipravat, Mrs. Kanitta Meesook and Mr.
Siri Ganjarerndee of Department of Eco-
nomic Research, Bank of Thailand, Mr. K.
Clark, Mr. R. Siegel and Mr. S. Arai of Data
Processing Section, ESCAP, and Mr. A.
Kohno and Mr. S. Abe of Development
Planning Division, ESCAP, to whom deep
appreciations are expressed. Views and re-
maining errors in the paper, however, are
solely of the author.
** iI~:J't!J!J, The Center for Southeast Asian
Studies, Kyoto University
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Siri Ganjarerndee [1979a], etc.).l) The
Bank of Thailand model (abbreviated as
BOT model) is now under continuous
revisions and improvements in accordance
with updated basic data. It is employed
as the country model for Thailand in the
Asian Sub-Link Project of the Center
for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto Uni-
versity.2) The purpose of this paper is
to investigate basic features and work-
abilities of the BOT model theoretically
and empirically (Section 2), and to
derive some policy implications for the
Thai economy based on the simulation
analyses applied to the BOT model
(Section 3). The present paper may
be considered as a supplement to the
research works of the Bank of Thailand
on the macroeconometric model building
for the Thai economy.3)
1) See Olarn Chaipravat [1976] for a brief
chronology and assessment of the Thai
econometric models.
2) The project is organized and headed by
Professor Shinichi Ichimura. The BOT
model is adopted as a country model also in
the medium-term projections project of
ESCAP.
3) See Olarn Chaipravat, Kanitta Meesook
and Siri Ganjarerndee [1979b] for the
current version of BOT model. See its
references for the earlier versions and the
related researches made at Bank ofThailand.
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IT Basic Features and Workabilities
of the BOT Model
The latest version of Bank of Thailand
model was presented at the Asian Sub-
Link Project Symposium held on March
22-24, 1979 in Kyoto, Japan. The
symposium paper (Olarn Chaipravat,
Kanitta Meesook and Siri Ganjarerndee
[1979a] or [1979b]) contains not only a
full presentation of the whole system of
BOT model but also a detailed explana-
tion on each structural equation, giving
relevant economic backgrounds in the
Thai economy.4) Here we will pinpoint
a general equilibrium framework adopted
for the Thai economy which may be
considered as the most essential feature
of the BOT model and, then, discuss
about several other features and work-
abilities of the model based on such
testing simulations as partial, total and
final tests, which are not shown in the
symposium paper mentioned above.
11-1 General Equilibrium Setup of the BO T
Model
The Bank of Thailand model is a
non-linear system of 184 equations, of
which the first 115 equations constitute
the real sector of the system while the
remaining 69 equations describe the
financial sector of the system. Variables
in the real sector consist of productions,
expenditures (including exports and im-
ports), incomes (including tax revenues),
4-) See the symposium paper for the notation
and structural equations of BOT model,
which are omitted here to save space.
prices, wages, employment, capital stocks,
and so on. These real variables are
dependent, more or less, on the financial
sector through the following financial




R TDCB*, RSDCB*, R TDFC *,
RSDFC*, RDDFC*, RTGS*,
RGBHH *, and RFO*.
Variables in the financial sector, on the
other hand, consist of deposits, lendings,
borrowings, interest rates, etc., in the
four major financial institutions of Thai-
land (i.e., commercial banks, finance
companies, government saving bank and
central bank). Variables corresponding
to the balance of payments account
constitute the final part of the financial
sector. These financial variables are also
dependent on the real sector through a
number of real variables, so that the
system as a whole is a system of inter-
dependence to be determined simul-
taneously. However, the interactions
between real and financial sectors are
not symmetrical in that the dependence
of the financial sector on the real sector
is far stronger than the converse. Equa-
tions in the system except identities are
all estimated by ordinary least squares
method (OLS). Real equations are esti-
mated for the period around 1961-1976,
while financial equations are estimated
for 1969-1976.
There are four supply-demand equi-
librium conditions in the BOT model.
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One is in the real sector and the other
three are in the financial sector. Most
of the variables in the real sector are
interdependent with each other in a
complicated manner. From the aggre-
gate point of view, however, there exists
a key equation which plays a role of
mediator in the complex interdependent
system of the real sector. It is the real
aggregate demand and supply equality
of goods and services Ceq. (70) which is







( demand )Expenditure functions
domestic price level (PD which is the
deflator for both consumption and invest-
ment expenditures). This framework is
illustrated in Fig. 1. The main part of
the real sector is the production-employ-
ment-income-expenditure block, in which
variables are not only interdependent
with each other but also dependent on
PD and other prices (and also on several
financial variables listed above). PD, on
the other hand, is dependent on the levels



























Fig. 1 Equilibrium Setup in the Real Sector
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and MGSR) and supplies (GDPR) which
are determined in the main block.5)
The same is true for PGDNA (non-
agricultural price deflator) to be deter-
mined by the nominal aggrega te demand
and supply identity (eq. (71».6) The
other prices are dependent on PD and
PGDNA but not on the variables in the
main block. Note that eq. (70) of Fig. 1,
which describes the equilibrium condition
directly in the form of implicit function,
must be transformed into alternative
explicit form with PD on the left-hand
side:
PD=(CONGV*+IFXGVAG*





Such a transformation is necessary In
solving the non-linear system of BOT
model by the Gauss-Seidel method.7)







These may be regarded as an ingeneous
device in the real sector of BOT model.
5) MGSR is determined by the demand factors
but not by the supply conditions, so that
MGSR may better be placed on the right-
hand side of eq. (70) with minus sign.
6) Another appropriate variable, if any, may
be selected in place of PGDNA as a variable
to be determined by this nominal identity.
7) See the appendix of this paper for the Gauss-
Seidel method.
The financial sector of BOT model has
three supply-demand equilibrium condi-
tions. The first is the market clearing
equation for loans, overdrafts and dis-
counts of commercial banks (FLNCBB U)
to determine commercial banks' lending
rate (RLCB). The second is the market
clearing identity for loans and discounts
of finance companies (FLDFCBU) to
determine finance companies' lending
rate (RLFC). The third is the identity
between supply of and demand for inter-
bank loans from commercial banks to
finance companies (FLOCBFC) to deter-
mine interbank market rate of interest
(RIB). These three equilibrium identities
together with their supply and demand
components, which are summarized in
Table l, constitute the main and essential
part of the financial sector in the BOT
model. The equilibrium framework of
the financial sector is clearcut and rather
straightforward compared to that of the
real sector, because various supply and
demand equations are directly connected
with the market clearing equilibrium
identities. It is quite interesting to see
that the sign conditions are satisfied
completely not only for income or saving
variables but also for relevant interest
rates in component demand and supply
functions. As stated for the real sector,
the Gauss-Seidel method requires to
express every endogenous variable by an
explicit function of other variables, so
that the three equilibrium equations
((145), (165) and (169» are solved for the
three equilibrium interest rates (RLCB,




Table 1 Equilibrium Setup of the Financial
Sector
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(143) FDXCBFO = f(XGS,
H
RLCB-.OIRFO*)

































RIB: FLOCBFCd = FLOCBFCs (eq. 169)
(+)
(169) FLOCBFCd = f(FLDFCBU,
(-)
RIB - .01 (RFO* +RGB*))
(+)(146) FLOCBFCs =f(FD TXXCB,
(+)
RIB - .99 (RLCB+RFO*
+RGB*»
* Numbers in brackets are equation numbers.
Signs in brackets mean those of the estimated
coefficients. PD=growth rate of PD. Note
that, in the original formulation, the last
three interest rates ofeq. (152) are combined
into a weighted average (.3RDDFC*+
.5RSDCB*+.2RTDCB*) as in eqs. (ISS),
(140) and so on. The same is true for the
interest rates in eqs. (153), (154), (166) and
(137). The best weighting scheme is
searched for empirically by using goodness of
fit criteria in the BOT model.
device in the real sector of BOT model.
computation.8)
The 28 endogenous variables in the
financial sector that correspond to the 28
financial equations of Table 1 are not
only interdependent with each other but
also dependent on such variables in the
real sector as GDP, USVHH, MGS, XGS
8) See alternative expressions of eqs. (145),
(165) and (169) shown in the symposium
paper.
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and IFXTO (and also on the exogenous
variables). On the other hand, the real
sector is dependent on such variables in
the financial sector as RLCB, RLFC,
FTDHBCB, FSDHBCB, FTDHBFC,
FSDHBFC, }?DDHBFC and FSTHBGS,
all of which except the last appear in
the equilibrium framework of Table 1.
The last FSTHBGS is determined by
eq. (173) with one real and several





-.1 (R TDFC *+R TDCB*))
Therefore, the real sector plus the main
part of the financial sector (Table I) plus
equation (173) can be regarded as a self-
complete system without any feed-back
effects from the rest of the financial sector.
The rest of the financial sector including
the balance of payments account is
determined only recursively, so that such
important variables as net foreign capital
inflow of private sector (FKFBPFO) ,
overall balance of payments position
(UBP$), etc. can affect neither the
performance of the real sector nor the
key variables In the financial sector.
This seems to be a weak point in the
BOT model.
11-2 Testing Traceability rif the BO T
~lodel
To what extent a model traces the
actual economy can be checked by
comparing the estimated values of each
variable in the model with the corre-
sponding actual data for the estimation
period. Three methods are usually used
to see this traceability of a model. The
first is the partial test, by which the
goodness of fit is checked for each
equation separately using actual data for
all of the explanatory variables in each
equation without distinguishing between
endogenous and predetermined (lagged
endogenous + exogenous) variables. The
second is the total test, by which the
goodness of fit is checked for the model
as a whole simultaneously but statically
using actual data for all of the predeter-
mined variables without distinguishing
between lagged endogenous and exoge-
nous variables in solving the system.
The third is the final test, by which the
goodness of fit is checked for the model as
a whole simultaneously and dynamically
using estimated values for the lagged
endogenous variables in solving the sys-
tem in each period successively. Not to
mention, the total test is a case of the
static simulation while the final test is a
case of the dynamic simulation.
The final test is important among
others in the sense that the performance
of a model can be unsatisfactory in the
light of the final test even if it is quite
satisfactory in the light of the partial and
total tests. However, all of the three
testing methods have been applied to the
BOT model since each method has some
merits of its own. For example, the
partial test can be applied to identities
to check their correctness. Actually,
errors or inconsistencies, though not
serious, were found in several identities
in the financial sector of BOT model (i.e.,
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eqs. (116), (159), (161) and (183)). The
results of partial test for the estimated
equations of BOT model are generally
satisfactory, reflecting high or proper
values of R2'S and Durbin-Watson ratios.
The results of total test are also fairly
satisfactory.
The final test has been applied to the
three cases of BOT model for the period
1969-19769) :
(a) the whole system,
(b) the real sector, treating all finan-
cial variables (eqs. (116)-(184))
as exogenous, and
(c) the financial sector, treating all
real variables (eqs. (1 )-( 115)) as
exogenous.
The results are again generally satisfac-
tory, especially for (b) and (c). Con-
cerning the whole system (case (a) ) ,
however, no remarkable differences are
found between (a) and (b) for the real
variables (1)-(115), while considerably
large discrepancies are observed between
(a) and (c) for several financial variables
(116)-(121), (148) and (149). A bad
performance of the whole system in
relation to these financial variables seems
to be caused by XGS $ (eq. (69)) and
MGS$ (eq. (37)) through UBP$ (eq.
(180)) and UBA$ (eq. (181)). Trace-
ability of the whole system is fairly
good for the other financial variables
including the three key interest rates and
the demand and supply equations which
9) Note that the estimation period for the
financial equations is 1969-1976. The final




determine them (See Table 1) . The
whole system (real+financia1) excluding
financial variables of bad performance
(i.e., equations (116)-(121), etc.) is self-
complete since those financial variables
of bad performance are determined only
recursively without giving any feed-back
effects to the rest of the system.10) It
seems, therefore, possible to effectively
make various policy simulations based
on the whole system, neglecting the results
on several financial variables which are
probably misleading but have no effects
on the essential part of the system.
Though most of the endogenous vari-
ables are generally traced well for the real
sector, some important quantities such as
GDPAGR, GDPNAR, GDPR, etc. tend to
be underestimated slightly in earlier years
of the estimation period while overesti-
mated slightly in later years, resulting in
a slight overestimation of their growth
rates for the sample period. Correspond-
ing nominal values, on the other hand,
are simulated well without showing any
tendency of overestimation or underesti-
mation. As a result, key aggregate
prices such as PD, PGDNA, PGDAG, etc.
tend to be overestimated slightly in
earlier years while underestimated slightly
in later years, indicating a slight under-
estimation of their growth rates in the
sample period. I t is difficult to find
direct and clearcut reasons for the bias
consistently observed for several key
10) It should be noted that a smaller system con-
sisting of the real sector, equations of Table 1
and eq. (173) is self-complete as explained
before.
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variables of the real sector in testing the
BOT model dynamically by final test.
III Policy SiJ:nulations for the
Thai EconoIny: 1972-1976
Various policy simulations have been
attempted for the Thai economy, giving
shocks to several selected exogenous
variables in the BOT model:
(1) public consumption expenditures
(CONGV)
(2) public investment expenditures
(IFXBSAG, IFXBSNA, IFXGVAG
and IFXGVNA treated as a group)
(3) exchange rate (ZXR$)
(4) world income (CDPWR1 and
CDPWR2 treated as a group)
(5) price of imported raw materials
and fuels (PMRM $), and
(6) price of export of agricultural
products (PXGAG$).
Shocks are given to these exogenous
variables in the form of increasing their
levels by 10% from their actual values
either throughout the simulation period
(1972-1976) or in the starting year (1972)
only:
( i ) sustained shocks gIven for the
1972-1976 period, and
(ii) once-and-for-all shocks given m
1972 only.
The simulation results for these shocked
cases are compared with the standard
simulation \\lithout shocks, which is the
same as the final test for the 1972-1976
period, to derive policy implications for
the Thai economy. Furthermore, the
shocked simulations are applied to two
cases of the BOT model:
(a) the whole system, and
(b) the real sector, treating all of the
financial variables as exogenous,
which make it possible to clarify further
the structure and characteristics of the
BOT model. The shocked simulations,
therefore, have been attempted in 24
(6 X 2 X 2) ways for the 1972-1976 period.
Simulation results on the sustained shocks
are summarized in Appendix Tables
A.I-A.8 on several key variables (i.e.,
GDPR, GDP, PD, USVFO$ and RLCB)
for illustrative purposes.lO These tables
are useful to see the time pattern of the
changes in key endogenous variables
caused by various external shocks. Here
we discuss results on the sustained shocks
only in terms of the multipliers and
elasticities averaged for the sinlulation
period 1972-1976. Results on the once-
and-for-all shocks are not referred to here
since they are quite similar to and less
conspICUOUS than those on the sustained
shocks.
111-1 Sustained Shocks on the Public Ex-
penditures
Public expenditures are often discussed
in connection with their multiplier effects
on various aspects of the aggregate econ-
omy. Since the exogenous shocks were
given to nominal public expenditures (i.e.,
government consumption expenditures
(CONGV) and investment expenditures
of state enterprises and general govern-
ment (lFXBSAG, 1FXBSNA, IFXGVAG
11) The original results (i.e., computer print-
outs) cover all of the 184 endogenous vari-
ables.
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a Defined as surplus.
b Multiplied by 20.0 to adjust exchange rate.
Table 2 Multipliers and Elasticities with
Respect to Nominal Public
Expenditures, Average Results
for 1972-1976
and IFXCVNA)), we discuss here the
multipliers in nominal terms and supple-
ment them with relevant elasticities.




elasticities of several selected variables
with respect to nominal public consump-
tion and investment expenditures based
on the average results for the 1972-1976
period. Note in the table that elasticities
of real variables (CDPR, etc.) with
respect to nominal expenditures are
somewhat misleading. However, elas-
ticities of real variables with respect to
real expenditures can be estimated ap-
proximately by allowing for the elasticity
of PD which is used as the common
deflator for both consumption and invest-
ment in the BOT model. For example,
the elasticity of CDPR with respect to real
public consumption may be approximated
as .045/(1.0-.163)=.054 based on the
figures for the whole system in Table 2.
From the table, we can see that the
multiplier or elasticity effects of public
consumption are generally larger than
those of public investment. This should
be so possibly for the nominal variables in
which price factors are automatically
involved. General price levels (PD, etc.)
in the BOT model are determined by
various supply and demand conditions.
Public consumption is a demand factor
with no direct effects on production while
public investment, though it is also a
demand factor, directly affects production
capacity through capital accumulation,
resulting in far bigger price increases in
the former than in the latter. Real
variables (GDPR, etc.), however, show a
little bigger elasticities for public con-
sumption than for public investment in
Table 2. This seems to be caused by
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implications on supply capacities since
the elasticity of CDPR with respect to
CO NG V tends to decline overtime for the
simulation period while the elasticity for
IFXBS and IFXGV has a constant
tendency to increase overtime.l2) It is
interesting to see in Table 2 that the
elasticities of CDPAGR and XGSR (whose
major components are agricultural ex-
ports) are negatively large in the case of
public consumption while they are either
positive or negative but very small in
absolute values in the case of public
investment. This is due to the shift of
labor from agriculture to non-agriculture
caused by the enlarged effective demand,
the nature of which is different between
public consumption and public invest-
ment as mentioned above,13)
The real sector of BOT model, where
all of the financial variables are treated
as exogenous, exaggerates slightly the
multiplier or elasticity effects of public
expenditures. Government deficit finan-
cing to increase its consumption and
investment expenditures necessarily leads
to the excess demand in the financial
market, resulting in the rise in market
clearing interest rates (RLCB, RLFC and
RIB) as shown in Table 2. Results on
the real sector do not allow for this aspect
of interaction between real and financial
markets. Yet, the discrepancies are not
12) See Tables A.l and A.2. The same is true
for GDPNAR and NEMNA, though the
results on them are not shown in the ap-
pendix tables.
13) Note that agricultural exports (XGAGR) is
dependent not only on demand factors but
also on supply conditions (See eq. (64)).
very large between the whole system and
the real sector, indicating the role of
financial sector as supplementary (but
neither negligible nor unimportant) to
the real sector in the actual economic
activities.
111-2 Sustained Shocks on the Exchange Rate
and the World Income
Let us next consider the shocked simu~
lations for the changes in exchange rate
and world income. In the former, the
exchange rate of bahts per US dollars
(ZXR$) was increased by 10% from
about 20 Bj$ to about 22 Bj$ for the
period 1972-1976. In the latter, the two
kinds of world income (GDPWRI and
GDPWR2) were made higher by 10%>
than their actual levels during the period
1972-1976. Table 3 summarizes simula-
tion results for the above two cases in
terms of average multipliers and average
elasticities.l4) Note that multipliers are
not calculated in the latter case of world
income since the data for world income
are not original but in the form of indexes
with unit value (1.0) for the base year.
We discuss, first, the case of exchange
rate changes. We can see from Table 3
that the baht devaluation has positive
and favorable effects on various aspects
of the Thai economy. For example, the
10% devaluation in bahts will increase
trade surplus (or decrease trade deficit)
by 71 million US dollars, nominal GDP
by 14 billion bahts or 5.54%, real
14) See Tables A.S and AA for the time pattern
of the changes in key endogenous variables.
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Table 3 Multipliers and Elasticities with
Respect to Exchange Rate and
World Income, Average Results
for 1972-1976
Exchange rate World income
Whole Real Whole Real












GDP .554 .620 .195 .221
GDPAG .720 .757 .084 .097
GDPNA .480 .558 .246 .277
XGS$ .002 .001 .539 .539
MGS$ -.247 -.139 .287 .332
-USVFO$ 4.679 2.659 3.801 2.992
UBP$ 4.893 3.842
FKFBPFO 1.209 .054
YLBNA .470 .541 .209 .237
GDPR .051 .071 .058 .066
GDPAGR .023 .019 -.016 -.018
GDPNAR .064 .094 .090 .102
XGSR .088 .076 .517 .512
MGSR -.273 -.157 .283 .333
NEMNA .134 .179 .185 .204
WGRNA .356 .383 .026 .036




* Note that the figures for multipliers mean the
average annual changes in the variables listed
here in the case of 10 % devaluation of baht
(approximately from 20 B/$ to 22 B/$) for the
1972-1976 period. Measuring units for mul-
tipliers are either million bahts or million US
dollars.
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production levels (CDPR, CDPACR and
GDPNAR) by O.2°!c>-O.6<yo, non-agricul-
tural employment by 1.34% and so on. 15)
The baht devaluation, of course, has
unfavorable effects also for the Thai
economy. For example, the same IO°!c>
devaluation will cause 5.16% increase in
general price level (PD) , which, however,
is not large enough to offset completely
the favorable effects mentioned above. 16)
In other words, increases in nominal
levels caused by devaluation will be
offset to some extent by rising prices,
resulting in a slight improvement of
various economic activities in real terms.
I t may be concluded, therefore, that the
devaluation of bahts will improve the
balance of payments situation in Thailand
without deteriorating the national welfare
in real terms. The baht devaluation
seems to be one of the possible measures
to be discussed seriously in order to solve
the balance of payments problem which
Thailand is currently facing.
Multipliers and elasticities for the case
of exchange rate changes in Table 3
indicate only small discrepancies between
the whole system and the real sector
except for those of imports (MGS $) (and
also those of the surplus in current
balance (- USVFO$) as a consequence) .
Imports have become exceptional because
of the structure of the model. In other
words, two major components of imports,
15) Note that these figures are approximate
averages and other conditions are assumed
to be unchanged in deriving them.
16) Real consumption also increases, though
slightly, in spite of price increases.
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I.e., import of raw materials and fuels
(MRMR) and import of capital goods
(MKR) , receive considerable influences
from interest rates (i.e., RLCB and RLFC)





The real sector where all of the financial
variables including RLCB and RLFC are
treated as exogenous cannot allow for
this dependency on the financial sector,
resulting in a considerable discrepancy
for imports (MGS$) in Table 3. We
must be very careful in dealing with the
financial sector because we may obtain
misleading results on some variables if the
financial sector is completely neglected.
Let us next consider the case where
the world income was changed. The
resul ts are more or less similar to those
of the previous case where the exchange
rate was changed but, in nature, more
moderate and more favorable for the
Thai economy. In other words, the
rise in foreign income brings about many
windfall benefits to Thailand through
her export growth such as rise in both
nominal and real GDP's, considerable
improvement in balance of payments
deficit, etc., without giving any unfavor-
able effects such as inflationary pressures
unlike the previous case of baht devalua-
tion. The present case is the growth led
by exports but helped by lucky conditions
In foreign countries which Thailand
cannot always expect to exist. The
previous case, on the other hand, has
much III common with the growth
through import substitution. It is quite
interesting to see in the Thai economy
that exports do not increase significantly
while imports decrease considerably when
the exchange rate is devalued.
//1-3 Sustained Shocks on the Import Price
of Raw Materials and Fuels and the
Export Price of Agricultural Products
Sustained shocks were given also to
two important price variables III the
Thai international trade. First, the im-
port prIce of raw materials and fuels
(PMRM$) was increased by 10% for the
1972-1976 period. Second, the export
price of agricultural products (PXGAGS)
was increased by 10% for the same
simulation period. These two cases seem
to be useful to analyze the performance
of Thai economy in the first half of the
1970's. In that period, the Thai econ-
omy, like many other developing coun-
tries, suffered from the oil shocks (1973-
74) but, at the same time, enjoyed the
boom in primary commodities (1972-74)
which offset their unfavorable effects. 17)
As a result, Thailand could show a good
performance in GDP growth and balance
of payments even during the period of
oil shocks, where most of the developed
countries experienced rather severe reces-
sions under balance of payments pres-
sures. To analyze this situation properly,
however, it seems better to investigate
17) For a general description of the commodities
export boom in the ESCAP region, see
ESCAP [1978], pp. 39-44.
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18~ I-f}
cording to our estimates of average
elasticities, only 2% increase in PXGAG$
is enough to offset the unfavorable effects
* The figures here are based on the case of 10%
increase in PMRM$ or PXGAG $ for the
1972-1976 period. See Table 5 for the figures
based on the opposite case.
Table 4: Elasticities with Respect to Import
Price of Raw Materials and Fuels
and Export Price of Agricultural
Products, Average Results for
1972-1976*















































































































































18) See Tables A.5 and A,6 for positive shocks
while Tables A.7 and A.S for negative shocks.
not only the case of positive shocks
mentioned above but also the case of
negative shocks where PMRM$ and
PXGAG$ respectively are decreased by
10% for the simulation period 1972-1976.
Average elasticities corresponding to
positive shocks are summarized in Table
4, while those corresponding to negative
shocks are summarized In Table 5.18)
No remarkable differences are found
between the two tables though the elas-
ticities of negative shocks are slightly
bigger than those of positive shocks in
almost all cases. The BOT model may
be said to give almost symmetrical results
on policy simulations whether the exo-
genous shocks are given in the positive
direction or in the negative direction.
As seen from Table 4 (or Table 5), the
rise in import price of raw materials and
fuels (PMRM$) causes negative or unfa-
vorable effects on such key variables as
balance of payments, real productions
(except GDPAGR) , non-agricultural em-
ployment and general price levels. On
the contrary, the rise in export price of
agricultural products (PXGAG$) causes
positive or favorable effects on the same
variables. However, the favorable effects
of the rise in PXGAG$ are considerably
larger In degree than the unfavorable
effects of the rise In PMRM$. This
seems to be due to the industrial structure
of Thailand where agriculture still oc-
cupies a significant position not only in
exports but also In productions. Ac-
80
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* The figures here are based on the case of 10%
decrease in PMRM$ or PXGAG$ for the 1972-
1976 period.
Table 5 Elasticities with Respect to Import
Price of Raw Materials and Fuels
and Export Price of Agricultural
Products, Average Results for 1972-
1976: the Case of Negative Shocks*
of 100/0 Increase In PMRAJ$ In the
case of current balance of paytmens
( - USVFO) , while only 3% in the case
of real overall production (GDPR). It




must, however, be noted that the BOT
model may underestimate the effects of
changes in PMRM$, because there exist
no direct linkages from imports of raw
rnaterials and fuels (MRMR) to real
productions (CDPNAR) In the BOT
model which employs production func-
tions of the ordinary value added type.
Still, our simulation results may be
considered as a quantitative evidence
which explains the good performance of
the Thai economy during the oil shock
period.
The three interest rates (RLCB, RLFC
and RIB) are affected in a different
manner by the changes in PMRM $ and
PXCAC $. This is due to the supply
and demand structure of the financial
sector and its interactions with the real
sector (See Table 1). In other words,
increases in PMRM$ causes excess de-
mand for loans of commercial banks
(FLNCBBU) through the increase in
private sector's demand for discounts of
import bills and trust receipts at com-
mercial banks (FDMCBB U) under the
depressed phase of the national economy.
On the other hand, increase in PXCAC $
causes excess demand for loans ofcommer-
cial banks (FLNCBBU) through the
increase in foreign sector's demand for
discounts of export bills at commercial
banks (FDXCBFO) under the boomed
phase of the national economy. Further-
more, whether the national economy is
depressed or boomed is a crucial factor
to determine the supply of funds for
loans of both commercial banks and













































































































































such Income variables as GDP and
USVHH. By this structure of supply
and demand interactions are generated
our results on the three interest rates as
shown in Table 4 or Table 5.
IV Concluding RelDarks
We have stressed the general equi-
librium nature of the Bank of Thailand
model in clarifying its basic features. It
is quite interesting to see that such an
equilibrium system is effective in de-
scribing not only the real sector but also
the financial sector of a developing
country like Thailand. We have also
applied the BOT model to various testing
and policy simulations to check its
workabilities and to derive policy impli-
cations for the Thai economy.
The BOT model is well formulated
theoretically, and fairly workable em-
pirically. It seems, however, that the
BOT model has some minor deffects to
be improved in the successive revisions
in accordance with updated basic data.
For example, first, the balance of pay-
ments variables to be determined only
recursively have no effects on the essential
part of the system. Second, the model
tends to generate a slight but consistent
bias for such key variables as production
levels and corresponding prices. Third,
there exist no direct linkages from im-
ported raw materials and fuels to real
productions in the system. These points
may be worthy of detailed investigations
in the subsequent researches for a new
version of BOT model.
The BOT model is a system of non-
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linear equations formulated in conformity
with the Gauss-Seidel method to solve
it. The appendix of this paper provides
a very brief review of the Gauss-Seidel
method,19) It is hoped that the review
is useful not only for a technical under-
standing of the BOT model but also for
a reference in the actual computations of
other non-linear systems.
Appendix: The Gauss-Seidel Method
The Gauss-Seidel method is an itera-
tive technique for solving the non-linear
system of equations. It can be illus-
trated, without loss of generality, by a
simple case of three-equation system.
First, write the three non-linear equations
in the form of explicit functions:
YI fl(YZ,Y3, z), Y2 f2(YbY3, z)
and Y3 f3(Yb Yz, z)
where z is a vector of predetermined
variables with fixed values.
Then, the iteration begins with the values
ofyt's computed as:
{
Yill fl (y~Ol, y~Ol, z)
y~ll :f2(Ylll , y~O), z)
y~l> f3(y~1>,y~ll, z)
where
y~O) = initial value ofYi' and
y~ll=value ofYi in the first
iteration.
For the k-th iteration, we compute
Ytkl fl(yhk-ll,y~k-ll, z)
{ y~kl f2(yikl , y~k-ll, z)
y~kl f3(yikl , y~kl, z)
19) See Johnson and van Peeterssen [1976] for
various methods of solving nonlinear system
of equations in relation to the Project LINK.
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This iterative process continues until the
computed y/s satisfy some appropriate
convergence criterion like
(i=l, 2, 3)
where f/S are sufficiently small num~
bers.20)
This IS the ordinary procedure of the
Gauss-Seidel method. We have, how-
ever, applied a modified procedure to
the BOT model, which computes the
values ofy/s in the k-th iteration as21)
yik ) yik - ll +0.5'
(f1(yhk- 1), y~k-l}, z) --yik - ll )
y~k) yhk - ll +0.5'
(f2(yilc ) , yhk - ll , z) -yhlc - ll )
y~k) y~lc-l) +0.5'
(f3(y''l) , y~k), z) -Yhlc - ll )
I t should be noted that the Gauss-Seidel
method, whether it is the original version
or the modified one, does not always give
converged solutions to a system to be
solved, depending on the nature of the
system, the selection of initial values, and
so on.
20) The convergence criterion
I y(l)/y~k-1l_1.01 < 10-5 (for any i)
was employed for the BOT model.
21) This modified version was proposed by Mr.
Satoshi Yasuda of Kyoto University. He
was kind enough to let the author use his
computer program on the Gauss-Seidel
method.
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Table A.I Sustained Shocks on CONGV (10% up for 1972-76)*
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Average**
GDPR (Variable 5):
(lW) Standard, WS 163,717 180,568 201,108 211,629 224,976 196,400
(I R)
"
RS 163,951 180,550 200,520 212,110 224,839 196,394
(2W) Shocked, WS 164,792 181,405 202,060 212,457 225,748 197,292
(2 R)
"
RS 165,138 181,497 201,668 213,073 225,800 197,435
(3W) (2W)- (IW) 1,075 836 951 828 771 892
(3 R) (2R)-(lR) 1,186 947 1,148 963 961 1,041
(4W) (3W)j(IW) .0066 .0046 .0047 .0039 .0034 .0045
(4R) (3R)/(IR) .0072 .0052 .0057 .0045 .0043 .0053
GDP (Variable 8) :
(IW) Standard, WS 172,292 208,868 274,023 296,591 336,220 257,599
(1 R) II RS 173,197 208,747 271,060 298,800 335,670 257,495
(2W) Shocked, WS 176,376 212,729 279,559 302,494 343,059 262,844
(2 R)
"
RS 177,730 213,031 277,389 305,295 343,258 263,341
(3W) (2W)- (IW) 4,084 3,861 5,536 5,902 6,839 5,244
(3 R) (2R)-(lR) 4,533 4,283 6,329 6,495 7,588 5,845
(4W) (3W)j(IW) .0237 .0185 .0202 .0199 .0203 .0204
(4R) (3R)/(IR) .0262 .0205 .0233 .0217 .0226 .0227
PD (Variable 70):
(IW) Standard, WS 1.0419 1.1040 1.3428 1.4183 1.5169 1.2848
(1 R) II RS 1.0455 1.1035 1.3315 1.4262 1.5153 1.2844
(2W) Shocked, WS 1.0580 1.1190 1.3652 1.4429 1.5434 1.3057
(2 R) II RS 1.0633 1.1200 1.3569 1.4528 1.5441 1.3074
(3W) (2W) - (IW) .0161 .0151 .0224 .0246 .0265 .0209
(3 R) (2R)-(lR) .0178 .0166 .0254 .0266 .0288 .0230
(4W) (3W)j(IW) .0154 .0136 .0167 .0174 .0175 .0163
(4R) (3R)/(IR) .0170 .0150 .0191 .0187 .0190 .0179
USVFO$ (Variable 101):
(IW) Standard, WS 192.86 -175.66 -239.05 203.82 785.30 153.45
(1 R) II RS 207.48 -175.81 -296.03 240.23 779.45 151.06
(2W) Shocked, WS 245.93 -117.02 -145.22 307.96 915.73 241.47
(2 R) II RS 268.29 -109.04 -187.53 358.58 925.80 251.22
(3W) (2W) - (lW) 53.06 58.64 93.83 104.13 130.43 88.02
(3 R) (2R)- (1R) 60.81 66.77 108.49 118.35 146.35 100.15
(4W) (3W)/(IW) .2752 -.3338 -.3925 .5109 .1661 .5736
(4R) (3R)j(IR) .2931 -.3798 -.3665 .4927 .1878 .6630
RLCB (Variable 145):
(IW) Standard, WS 11.0982 10.8261 11.5996 12.2640 11.4141 11.4404
(1 R) II RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(2W) Shocked, WS 11.2875 11.0664 11.8804 12.5520 11.7104 11.6993
(2 R) II RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(3W) (2W) - (IW) .1893 .2402 .2808 .2880 .2963 .2589
(3 R) (2R)-(IR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
(4W) (3W)/(IW) .0171 .0222 .0242 .0235 .0260 .0226
(4R) (3R)/(IR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
* Standard, WS = Standard Simulation based on the whole system.
II RS= II II /I /I /I real sector.
Shocked, WS = Shocked /I /I /I II whole system.
/I RS= /I /I /I /I /I real sector.
** Average=Arithmetic average for 1972-76.
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Table A.2 Sustained Shocks on IFXBS's and IFXGV's (10% up for 1972-76)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Average
GDPR (Variable 5):
(IW) Standard, WS 163,717 180,568 201,108 211,629 224,976 169,400
(1 R) r/ RS 163,951 180,550 200,520 212,110 224,839 196,394
(2W) Shocked, WS 164,157 180,927 201,609 212,398 225,955 197,009
(2 R) N RS 164,480 180,960 201,104 213,002 225,962 197,104
(3W) (2W)-(1W) 440 358 500 768 978 609
(3 R) (2R) - (lR) 528 418 584 892 1,123 709
(4\V) (3W)j(IW) .0027 .0020 .0025 .0036 .0044 .0031
(4R) (3R)j(1R) .0032 .0023 .0029 .0042 .0050 .0036
GDP (Variable 8):
(IW) Standard, WS 172,292 208,868 274,023 296,591 336,220 257,599
(1 R) II RS 173,197 208,747 271,060 298,800 335,670 257,495
(2W) Shocked, WS 174,029 209,936 275,234 298,701 338,973 259,374
(2 R) N RS 175,283 210,037 272,585 301,426 339,037 259,674
(3W) (2W)-(1W) 1,737 1,067 1,211 2,109 2,753 1,775
(3 R) (2R)-(lR) 2,086 1,289 1,525 2,626 3,367 2,179
(4W) (3W)j(IW) .0101 .0051 .0044 .0071 .0082 .0069
(4R) (3R)j(IR) .0120 .0062 .0056 .0088 .0100 .0085
PD (Variable 70):
(IW) Standard, WS 1.0419 1.1040 . 1.3428 1.4183 1.5169 1.2848
(1 R) N RS 1.0'!55 1.1035 . 1.3315 1.4262 1.5153 1.2844
(2W) Shocked, WS 1.0488 1.1073 1.3456 1.4240 1.5230 1.2897
(2 R) N RS 1.0.538 1.1076 1.3355 1.4336 1.5234 1.2908
(3W) (2W)- (lW) .0069 .0033 .0028 .0057 .0062 .0050
(3 R) (2R) - (IR) .0082 .0041 .0040 .0074 .0081 .0064
(4W) (3W)j(I\N) .0066 .0030 .0021 .0040 .0041 .0039
(4R) (3R)j(IR) .0079 .0037 .0030 .0052 .0053 .0050
USVFO$ (Variable 101):
(lW) Standard, WS 192.8697 -175.6693 -239.0589 203.8281 785.3048 153.4549
(1 R) N RS 207.4824 -175.8165 -296.0324 240.2303 779.4506 151.0629
(2W) Shocked, WS 228.5153 -147.5729 -210.4359 251.7036 854.3296 195.3079
(2 R) /I RS 249.0998 -143.1929 -261.1886 299.1607 862.2455 201.2249
(3W) (2W)- (IW) 35.6456 28.0963 28.6229 47.8755 69.0248 41.8530
(3 R) (2R) - (lR) 41.6174 32.6236 34.8438 58.9304 82.7949 50.1620
(4W) (3W)j(lW) .1848 -.1599 -.1197 .2349 .0879 .2727
(4R) (3R)j(IR) .2006 -.1856 -.1177 .2453 .1062 .3321
BLeB (Variable 145):
(IW) Standard, WS 11.0982 10.8261 11.5996 12.2640 11.4141 11.4404
(I R) r/ RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(2W) Shocked, WS 11.2387 10.9526 11.7117 12.4190 11.6110 11.5866
(2 R) /I RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(3W) (2W)-- (IW) .1405 .1264 .1120 .1550 .1969 .1462
(3 R) (2R)-(IR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
(4W) (3W)j(1 W) .0127 .0117 .0097 .0126 .0173 .0128
(4R) (3R)j(IR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
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Table A.3 Sustained Shocks on ZXR$ (10% up for 1972-76)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Average
CDPR (Variable 5):
(IW) Standard, \VS 163,717 180,568 201,108 211,629 224,976 196,400
(1 R) 1/ RS 163,951 180,550 200,520 212,110 224,839 196,394
(2W) Shocked, WS 165,909 181,596 202,389 212,100 225,057 197,410
(2 R) II RS 166,486 181,836 202,299 212,987 225,358 197,793
(3W) (2W)- (IW) 2,192 1,027 1,280 470 80 1,010
(3 R) (2R)-(IR) 2,534 1,286 1,779 877 518 1,399
(4W) (3W)j(IW) .0134 .0057 .0064 .0022 .0004 .0051
(4R) (3R)j(IR) .0155 .0071 .0089 .0041 .0023 .0071
GDP (Variable 8) :
(IW) Standard, WS 172,292 208,868 274,023 296,591 336,220 257,599
(1 R) II RS 173,197 208,747 271,060 298,800 335,670 257,495
(2W) Shocked, WS 182,738 219,323 290,742 312,451 354,156 271,882
(2 R) II RS 185,070 220,302 289,923 316,573 355,455 273,465
(3W) (2W)- (IW) 10,446 10,455 16,718 15,859 17,936 14,283
(3 R) (2R) - (IR) 11,873 11,555 18,863 17,773 19,785 15,970
(4W) (3W)j(IW) .0606 .0501 .0610 .0535 .0533 .0554
(4R) (3R)/(lR) .0686 .0554 .0696 .0595 .0589 .0620
PD (Variable 70):
(IW) Standard, WS 1.0419 1.1040 1.3428 1.4183 1.5169 1.2848
(1 R) II RS 1.0455 1.1035 1.3315 1.4262 1.5153 1.2844
(2W) Shocked, WS 1.0941 1.1540 1.4161 1.4910 1.6001 1.3510
(2 R) II RS 1.1035 1.1577 1.4126 1.5061 1.6043 1.3568
(3W) (2W)- (IW) .0522 .0500 .0733 .0727 .0832 .0663
(3 R) (2R) - (IR) .0580 .0542 .0811 .0799 .0890 .0724
(4W) (3W)j(IW) .0501 .0453 .0546 .0513 .0549 .0516
(4R) (3R)/(IR) .0554 .0491 .0609 .0560 .0587 .0564
USVFC$ (Variable 101):
(IW) Standard, WS 192.8697 -175.6693 -239.0589 203.8281 785.3048 153.4549
(1 R) II RS 207.4824 -175.8165 -296.0324 240.2303 779.4506 151.0629
(2W) Shocked, WS 139.8364 -246.0215 -279.5664 116.1889 677.8304 81.6536
(2 R) II RS 174.9962 -226.2294 -293.3211 188.7451 710.2964 110.8975
(3W) (2W)- (IW) -53.0333 -70.3522 -40.5075 -87.6392 -107.4744 -71.8013
(3 R) (2R) - (IR) -32.4862 -50.4130 2.7113 -51.4851 -69.1541 -40.1654
(4W) (3W)j(IW) -.2750 .4005 .1694 -.4300 -.1369 -.4679
(4R) (3R)j(IR) -.1566 .2867 -.0092 -.2143 -.0887 -.2659
RLCB (Variable 145):
(IW) Standard, WS 11.0982 10.8261 11.5996 12.2640 11.4141 11.4404
(1 R) II RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(2W) Shocked, WS 11.6009 11.4675 12.3964 13.0658 12.2208 12.1503
(2 R) II RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(3W) (2W)- (IW) .5027 .6413 .7968 .8017 .8067 .7099
(3 R) (2R) - (IR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
(4W) (3W)/(IW) .0453 .0592 .0687 .0654 .0707 .0620
(4R) (3R)j(IR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
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Table A.4 Sustained Shocks on GDPWR's (10% up for 1972-76)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Average
GDPR (Variable 5):
(IW) Standard, WS 163,717 180,568 201,108 211,629 224,976 196,400
(1 R) 1/ RS 163,951 180,550 200,520 212,110 224,239 196,394
(2W) Shocked, WS 164,814 181,455 202,334 212,807 226,267 197,535
(2 R) II RS 165,185 181,560 201,963 213,444 226,325 197,695
(3W) (2W)-(IW) 1,097 886 1,225 1,177 1,290 1,135
(3 R) (2R) - (lR) 1,233 1,010 1,443 1,334 1,485 1,301
(4W) (3W)/(IW) .0067 .0049 .0061 .0056 .0057 .0058
(4R) (3R)/(IR) .0075 .0056 .0072 .0063 .0066 .0066
GDP (Variable 8) :
(IW) Standard, WS 172,292 208,868 274,023 296,591 336,220 257,599
(1 R) 1/ RS 173,197 208,747 271,060 298,800 335,670 257,495
(2W) Shocked, WS 176,433 212,680 279,714 301,980 342,339 262,633
(2 R) 1/ RS 177,888 213,033 277,625 304,844 342,553 263,189
(3W) (2W) - (IW) 4,140 3,811 5,690 5,388 6,139 5,034
(3 R) (2R)-(IR) 4,691 4,285 6,565 6,044 6,883 5,694
(4W) (3W)/(IW) .0240 .0183 .0208 .0182 .0183 .0195
(4 R) (3R)/(lR) .0271 .0205 .0242 .0202 .0205 .0221
PD (Variable 70 ):
(IW) Standard, WS 1.0419 1.1040 1.3428 1.4183 1.5169 1.2848
(1 R) II RS 1.0455 1.1035 1.3315 1.4262 1.5153 1.2844
(2W) Shocked, WS 1.0577 1.1161 1.3597 1.4336 1.5328 1.3000
(2 R) 1/ RS 1.0634 1.1173 1.3517 1.4437 1.5335 1.3019
(3W) (2W)-(IW) .0158 .0122 .0170 .0154 .0160 .0153
(3 R) (2R)- (IR) .0179 .0138 .0202 .0176 .0181 .0175
(4W) (3W)j(lW) .0152 .0110 .0126 .0108 .0105 .0119
(4R) (3R)/(IR) .0171 .0125 .0152 .0123 .0120 .0136
USVFO$ (Variable 101):
(IW) Standard, WS 192.8697 -175.6693 -239.0589 203.8281 785.3048 153.4549
(l R) /1 RS 207.4824 -175.8165 -296.0324 240.2303 779.4506 151.0629
(2W) Shocked, WS 156.4323 -231.9461 -296.1842 133.7070 713.6507 95.1319
(2 R) 1/ RS 180.1779 -222.9634 -336.3585 184.8039 723.6314 105.8583
(3W) (2W) - (IW) - 36.4374 -56.2768 -57.1253 -70.1211 -71.6541 -58.3230
(3R) (2R)-(IR) -27.3045 -47.1469 -40.3261 -55.4263 -55.8192 -45.2046
(4W) (3W)/(IW) -.1889 .3204 .2390 -.3440 -.0912 -.3801
(4R) (3R)/(lR) - .1316 .2682 .1362 -.2307 -.0716 -.2992
RLCB (Variable 145):
(IW) Standard, WS 11.0982 10.8261 11.5996 12.2640 11.4141 11.4404
(1 R) 1/ RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(2W) Shocked, WS 11.3248 11.0993 11.9216 12.5714 11.7208 11.7276
(2 R) 1/ RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(3W) (2W)- (IW) .2266 .2732 .3219 .3074 .3067 .2872
(3 R) (2R) - (IR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
(4W) (3W)/(IW) .0204 .0252 .0278 .0251 .0269 .0251
(4R) (3R)/(IR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
87
Jt(i¥i7:J7Wf1G 18~1%
Table A.5 Sustained Shocks on PMRM$ (10% up for 1972-76)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Average
GDPR (Variable 5 ):
(IW) Standard, WS 163,717 180,568 201,108 211,629 224,976 196,400
(1 R) II RS 163,951 180,550 200,520 212,110 224,839 196,394
(2W) Shocked, WS 163,931 180,307 200,658 211,127 224,338 196,072
(2 R) II RS 164,209 180,296 200,089 211,659 224,222 196,095
(3W) (2W)-(IW) 214 -261 -449 -502 -638 -327
(3 R) (2R) - (IR) 257 -254 -430 -450 -616 -298
(4W) (3W)j(IW) .0013 -.0014 -.0022 -.0024 -.0028 -.0017
(4R) (3R)j(lR) .0016 -.0014 -.0021 -.0021 -.0027 -.0015
GDP (Variable 8):
(lW) Standard, WS 172,292 208,868 274,023 296,591 336,220 257,599
(1 R) II RS 173,197 208,747 271,060 298,800 335,670 257,495
(2W) Shocked, WS 173,379 209,407 274,877 297,832 337,823 258,664
(2 R) /I RS 174,461 209,326 271,979 300,262 337,361 258,678
(3W) (2W)- (lW) 1,087 538 854 1,240 1,603 1,064
(3 R) (2R)- (lR) 1,264 579 919 1,461 1,691 1,183
(4W) (3W)j(IW) .0063 .0026 .0031 .0042 .0048 .0041
(4R) (3R)j(lR) .0073 .0028 .0034 .0049 .0050 .0046
PD (Variable 70):
(IW) Standard; WS 1.0419 1.1040 1.3428 1.4183 1.5169 1.2848
(1 R) II RS 1.0455 1.1035 1.3315 1.4262 1.5153 1.2844
(2W) Shocked, WS 1.0516 1.1127 1.3535 1.4317 1.5339 1.2967
(2 R) II RS 1.0561 1.1123 1.3423 1.4405 1.5326 1.2968
(3W) (2W)- (lW) .0097 .0087 .0107 .0134 .0171 .0119
(3 R) (2R) - (lR) .0105 .0089 .0108 .0144 .0173 .0124
(4W) (3W)j(IW) .0093 .0079 .0080 .0095 .0112 .0093
(4R) (3R)j(lR) .0101 .0080 .0081 .0101 .0114 .0096
USVFO$ (Variable 101):
(lW) Standard, WS 192,8697 -175.6693 -239.0589 203.8281 785.3048 153.4549
(1 R) II RS 207.4824 -175.8165 -296.0324 240.2303 779.4506 151.0629
(2W) Shocked, WS 203.8456 -171.1288 -228.7776 221.1356 809.1330 166.8416
(2 R) /I RS 221.3397 -170.2025 -284.5880 262.0247 805.3047 166.7757
(3W) (2W)- (IW) 10.9759 4.5405 10.2813 17.3075 23.8282 13.3867
(3 R) (2R) - (lR) 13.8573 5.6140 11.4444 21.7944 25.8541 15.7128
(4W) (3W)j(IW) .0569 -.0258 -.0430 .0849 .0303 .0872
(4R) (3R)j(lR) .0668 -.0319 -.0387 .0907 .0332 .1040
RLCB (Variable 145):
(IW) Standard, WS 11.0982 10.8261 11.5996 12.2640 11.4141 11.4404
(1 R) II RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(2W) Shocked, WS 11.1552 10.8681 11.6403 12.3202 11.4844 11.4936
(2 R) II RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(3W) (2W)-(IW) .0570 .0420 .0406 .0561 .0703 .0532
(3 R) (2R) - (IR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
(4W) (3W)j(IW) .0051 .0039 .0035 .0046 .0062 .0047
(4R) (3R)j(lR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
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Table A.6 Sustained Shocks on PXCAC$ (1O~{) lip for 1972-76)
::=::..-~-..:=-~::::::=::=:::.------==-=:::-_-========--==-~-=-._-~-===-.:.==::=.:.......=::--::==::::.=:=~-===--~-==--
1972 1973 1974 1.975 1.976 Average
CDPR (Variable 5):
(1 \V) Standard, WS 163,717 180,568 201,108 211,629 224,976 196,400
(l R) II RS 163,951 180,550 200,520 212,110 224,839 196,394
(2W) Shocked, WS 163,959 181,671 202,895 213,385 226,918 197,766
(2 R) II RS 164,226 181,756 202,495 213,998 226,927 197,880
(3VV) (2W) - (IW) 242 1,102 1,786 1,755 1,941 1,365
(3 R) (2R)-(IR) 274 1.206 1,97-1 1,888 2,087 1,486
(4\V) (3W)J(IW) .0015 .0061 .0089 .0083 .0086 .0070
(4 R) (3R)J(IR) .0017 .0067 .0098 .0089 .0093 .0076
GDP (Variable 8) :
(IW) Standard, WS 172,292 208,868 274,023 296,591 336,220 257,599
(1 R) II RS 173,197 208,747 271,060 298,800 335,670 257,495
(2W) Shocked, WS 174,189 213,226 280,933 302,866 343,063 262,855
(2 R) II RS 175,227 213,544 278,797 305,704 343,140 263,282
(3W) (2W)-(IW) 1,896 4,357 6,909 6,274 6,843 5,256
(3 R) (2R)-(IR) 2,030 4,797 7,737 6,903 7,470 5,787
(4W) (3W)J(IW) .0110 .0209 .0252 .0212 .0204 .0204
(4 R) (3R)/(IR) .0117 .0230 .0285 .0231 .0223 .0225
PD (Variable 70) :
(1W) Standard, WS 1.0419 1.1040 1.3428 . 1.4183 1.5169 1.2848
(1 R) II RS 1.0455 1.1035 1.3315 1.4262 1.5153 1.2844
(2VV) Shocked, WS 1.0405 1.1062 1.3485 1,4198 1.5176 1.2865
(2 R) II RS 1.0447 1.1073 1.3404 1.4300 1.5180 1.2881
(3W) (2W)-(IW) -.0014 .0023 .0057 .0016 .0007 .0018
(3R) (2R)- (IR) -.0009 .0039 .0089 .0038 .0027 .0037
(4W) (3W)J(IW) -.0013 .0020 .0043 .0011 .0005 .0014
(4R) (3R)J(IR) -.0008 .0035 .0067 .0027 .0018 .0029
USVFO$ (Variable 101):
(IW) Standard, WS 192.8697 - 175.6693 -239.0589 203.8281 785.3048 153.4549
(1 R) II RS 207,4824 -175.8165 -296.0324 240.2303 779,4506 151.0629
(2W) Shocked, VVS 145.2700 -237,4501 -318.9845 106.4552 690.2807 77.1143
(2 R) II RS 161.9843 -229.7509 -359.9916 156.7573 698.1194 85.4237
(3W) (2W)-(IW) -47.5997 -61.7809 -79.9256 -97.3729 -95.0241 -76.3406
(3 R) (2R) - (IR) -45,4981 -53.9344 -63.9592 -83.4730 - 81.3312 -65.6392
(4W) (3W)/(IW) -.2468 .3517 .3343 -,4777 -.1210 -,4975
(4R) (3R)J(IR) -.2193 .3068 .2161 -.3475 -.1043 -.4345
RLCB (Variable 145):
(IW) Standard, WS 11.0982 10.8261 11.5996 12.2640 11.4141 11.4404
(l R) II RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(2W) Shocked, WS 11.1654 11.0428 11.9150 12.5717 11.7100 11.6810
(2 R) II RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(3W) (2W)- (IW) .0672 .2166 .3154 .3077 .2959 .2406
(3 R) (2R)-(IR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
(4W) (3W)/(IW) .0061 .0200 .0272 .0251 .0259 .0210
(4R) (3R)/(IR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
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Table A.7 Sustained Shocks on PMRM$ (10% down for 1972-76)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Average
GDPR (Variable 5) :
(IW) Standard, WS 163,717 180,568 201,108 211,629 224,976 196,400
(1 R) II RS 163,951 180,550 200,520 212,110 224,839 196,394
(2W) Shocked, WS 163,463 180,887 201,675 212,256 225,776 196,812
(2 R) II RS 163,649 180,857 201,065 212,671 225,606 196,770
(3W) (2W)- (IW) -253 319 566 626 800 411
(3 R) (2R) - (IR) -302 307 545 561 767 375
(4W) (3W)/(lW) -.0015 .0018 .0018 .0030 .0036 .0021
(4R) (3R)/(lR) -.0018 .0017 .0017 .0026 .0034 .0019
GDP (Variable 8) :
(IW) Standard, WS 172,292 208,868 274,023 296,591 336,220 257,599
(l R) II RS 173,197 208,747 271,060 298,800 335,670 257,495
(2W) Shocked, WS 171,005 208,208 273,027 295,106 334,340 256,337
(2 R) N RS 171,715 208,031 270,010 297,044 333,669 256,094
(3W) (2W)- (IW) -1,286 -660 -995 -1,485 -1,879 -1,261
(3 R) (2R) - (lR) -1,481 -716 -1,049 -1,755 -2,000 -1,400
(4W) (3W)/(IW) -.0075 -.0032 -.0036 -.0050 -.0056 -.0049
(4R) (3R)/(lR) -.0086 -.0034 -.0039 -.0059 -.0060 -.0054
PD (Variable 70 ):
(IW) Standard, WS 1.0419 1.1040 1.3428 1.4183 1.5169 1.2848
(I R) II RS 1.0455 1.1035 1.3315 1.4-262 1.5153 1.2844
(2W) Shocked, WS 1.0303 1.0933 1.3298 1.4020 1.4965 1.2704
(2 R) 1/ RS 1.0330 1.0926 1.3185 1.4089 1.4-946 1.2695
(3W) (2W)- (IW) -.0116 -.0107 -.0130 -.0163 -.0204 -.0144
(3 R) (2R) - (IR) -.0125 - .0109 -.0130 -.0173 -.0207 -.0149
(4W) (3W)/(IW) - .0112 -.0097 -.0096 -.0115 - .0134 - .0112
(4R) (3R)/(IR) - .0119 -.0099 -.0097 - .0121 -.0137 -.0116
USVFO$ (Variable 101 ):
(IW) Standard, WS 192.8697 -175.6693 -239.0589 203.8281 785.3048 153.4549
(l R) II RS 207.4824 -175.8165 -296.0324 240.2303 779.4506 151.0629
(2W) Shocked, WS 179.7975 -181.8823 -251.8356 182.2215 756.0055 136.8613
(2 R) II RS 191.2179 -183.3980 -309.6569 213.3094 747.2812 131.7507
(3W) (2W)- (IW) -13.0722 -6.2131 -12.7767 --21.6066 -29.2994 -16.5936
(3 R) (2R)-(lR) -16.2645 -7.5815 -13.6245 -26.9209 -32.1693 -19.3121
(4W) (3W)/(IW) -.0678 .0354 .0534 -.1060 -.0373 -.1031
(4R) (3R)/(IR) -.0784 .0431 .0460 -.1121 -.0413 -.1278
RLCB (Variable 145) :
(IW) Standard, WS 11.0982 10.8261 11.5996 12.2640 11.4141 11.4404
(I R) II RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(2W) Shocked, WS 11.0298 10.7753 11.5520 12.1970 11.3311 11.3770
(2 R) II RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(3W) (2W)- (IW) -.0684 -.0509 -.0476 -.067] -.0829 -.0634
(3 R) (2R) - (IR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
(4W) (3W)/(lW) -.0062 -.0047 -.0041 -.0055 -.0073 .0055
(4R) (3R)/(lR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
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Table A.8 Sustained Shocks on PXGAG$ (10% down for 1972-76)
1972 1973 1971- 1975 1976 Average
GDPR (Variable 5):
(IW) Standard, WS 163,717 180,568 201,108 211,629 224,976 196,400
(1 R) 1/ RS 163,951 180,550 200,520 212,110 224,839 196,394
(2W) Shocked. WS 163,512 179,438 199,280 209,856 223,030 195,023
(2 R) 1/ RS 163,718 179,314 198,496 210,195 222,740 194,893
(3W) (2W)- (IW) -204 -1,130 -1,827 -1,772 -1,946 -1,376
(3 R) (2R)-(IR) -233 -1,236 -2,023 -1,914 -2,098 -1,501
(4W) (3W)/(IW) -.0012 -.0063 -.0091 -.0084 -.0087 -.0070
(4 R) (3R)/(IR) -.0014 -.0068 -.0101 -.0090 -.0093 -.0076
GDP (Variable 8) :
(IW) Standard, WS 172,292 208,868 274,023 296,591 336,220 257,599
(1 R) 1/ RS 173,197 208,747 271,060 298,800 335,670 257,495
(2W) Shocked, WS 170,453 204,414 266,960 290,174 329,236 252,247
(2 R) 1/ RS 171,240 203,852 263,176 291,732 328,030 251,606
(3W) (2W)- (lW) -1,839 -4,454 -7,062 -6,416 -6,983 -5,351
(3 R) (2R)-(IR) -1,956 -4,895 -7,884 -7,067 -7,639 -5,888
(4W) (3W)/(IW) --.0113 --.0213 -- .0258 - .0216 -.0208 -- .0208
(4R) (3R)/(IR) -.0113 -.0234 -.0291 -.0237 -.0228 -- .0229
PD (Variable 70):
(IW) Standard, WS 1.0419 1.1040 1.3428 1.4183 1.5169 1.2848
(1 R) 1/ RS 1.0455 1.1035 1.3315 1.4262 1.5153 1.2844
(2W) Shocked, WS 1.0441 1.1013 1.3369 1.4166 1.5161 1.2831
(2 R) 1/ RS 1.0472 1.0996 1.3223 1.4222 1.5125 1.2808
(3W) (2W) - (IW) .0021 -.0022 -.0059 -.0017 -.0007 -.0017
(3 R) (2R)-(IR) .0017 -.0038 -.0092 -.0040 -.0028 -.0036
(4W) (3W)/(IW) .0021 -.0020 -.0044 -.0012 -.0005 -.0013
(4 R) (3R)/(lR) .0016 -.0035 -.0069 -.0028 -.0019 -.0028
USVFO$ (Variable 101):
(IW) Standard, WS 192.8697 -175.6693 -239.0589 203.8281 785.3048 153.4549
(1 R) 1/ RS 207.4824 - 175.8165 -296.0324 240.2303 779.4506 151.0629
(2W) Shocked, WS 241.9104 -113.7914 -159.0427 301.2311 880.2485 230.1112
(2 R) 1/ RS 254.6882 -121.6733 - 231.4221 323.6479 859.9621 217.0406
(3W) (2\1V) - (1 \IV) 4-9.0407 61.8778 80.01G2 97.4030 94.9437 76.6563
(3 R) (2R)-(IR) 47.2058 54.1432 64.6103 83.4176 80.5116 65.9777
(4W) (3W)/(IW) .2543 -.3522 -.3347 .4779 .1209 .4995
(4R) (3R)/(IR) .2275 -.3080 -.2183 .3472 .1033 .4368
RLCB (Variable 145):
(IW) Standard, WS 11.0982 10.8261 11.5996 12.2640 11.4141 11.4404
(1 R) /I RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(2\t\!) Shocked, WS 11.0356 10.6034 11.2728 11.9441 11.1081 11.1928
(2 R) II RS 10.7000 10.7300 12.3000 11.9900 11.4300 11.4300
(3W) (2W) - (1 \tV) -.0626 -.2228 -.3269 -.3199 -.3060 -.2476
(3 R) (2R)- (lR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
(4W) (3W)/(IW) -.0056 -.0206 -.0282 -.0261 -.0268 -.0216
(4R) (3R)/(lR) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
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